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created for its own amendment, and in the spirit which would in time tone down the passions and products of war" (p. 377).

Amongst the notable omissions in the book are the absence of any reference to the work of the Red Cross and similar agencies and to Mr. Hoover's great work in Belgium.

A few minor errors must be pointed out. There are occasional examples of careless proofreading such as broken type. The Russo-Turkish War was not in 1876-1877 but in 1877-1878 (p. 1). Bismarck did not become Prussian "Minister-President" in 1863 (p. 4) but on September 23, 1862. April 5, 1917, is given as the date of America's entry into the war, based on the passage of the declaratory resolution by the House. Doubtless the House Journal would show that the resolution was voted during the *legislative* day of April 5, but actually it was 3.00 a.m. April 6, and the resolution was signed by the President at 1.00 p.m. April 6 (p. 260). Mr. Pollard thinks that it was inevitable that "to the German cry of *Weltmacht* must sooner or later respond the American cry of *Weltrecht*."

In the light of recent charges that Mr. Wilson was seeking the Democratic nomination it is interesting to note that Mr. Pollard believes that "no American president is ever elected for a third term of office" (p. 261). But it is saddening, considering the action in the Senate on the Peace Treaty, to read: "The Americans were not a people to turn back, having put their hands to the plough" (p. 263).

One lays the book down with a feeling that it is, though not professedly so, an excellent brief for international solidarity.

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The Inside Story of Austro-Hungarian Intrigue of How the World War was brought about. By JOSEPH GORIČAR, formerly of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Service, and LYMAN BEECHER STOWE. Doubleday, Page and Company, New York, 1920.

Doctor Goričar, who was connected with the Austro-Hungarian Consular service for fourteen years, is a Slovene. As a Slav with undoubted Slavic sympathies, he came to view with dread the spread of the Pan-German influence in his country's foreign policy. The very interesting book under review is the result of his experiences under such conditions. To Mr. Stowe is undoubtedly due the clear and very readable style in which it is written.

Doctor Goričar's thesis is: "the Central Empires deliberately brought about the war—planned it, prepared for it, wanted it,

and feared only one thing—that they would not get it. Why? Their aim was a new division of the earth—a redistribution of the economic wealth of the world. . . . The first feature of this programme was the weakening of Russia. . . . The first step was to be a surprise attack on Serbia and Russia. Being unable to find—even after search—any justifiable pretext for war, the Central Empires, over a series of years notably in 1908, 1909, 1912, 1913, and 1914, fabricated pretexts. If they had not found, in the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, a most convenient excuse for war, the Foreign Office in Vienna would have continued its machinations against Serbia and Russia until it had succeeded in creating a *casus belli*.” (Preface, vii–viii.)

Since the form of this book was closed, there have appeared numerous fundamental contributions to our knowledge on this subject, such as the publications of the Austrian and German Foreign Offices and the memoirs and papers of various statesmen. On the whole, these tend to bear out the general statements of the work. They differ rather in details, than in the big issues.

Doctor Goričar takes us with him to Belgrade where the first plot was hatched to serve as a cause of war in case Serbia did not publicly acquiesce in the annexation of Bosnia in 1908. He exposes the way in which Nastić secured his idea and his information for his notorious pamphlet “Finale,” which became the basis of the charges that Serbia was engineering a revolution among the Serbo-Croats in Austria-Hungary. He traces the origin of much of Nastić’s work to Steinhardt, “a Jewish newspaper correspondent . . . who had been expelled from Belgrade” and who now “brooded vengeance.” He throws much light upon the Agram treason, as well as the Freidjung trials and shows in what a fiasco the policy of Count Aehrenthal ended. This part of the book and the part which deals with his trip through Russia in 1914 and his return to Vienna just before the declaration of war are first-hand contributions. His description of the economic basis of Serbia’s trouble with Austria-Hungary is the best account which has thus far appeared in English. Serbia’s economic life appeared to depend upon two things: what the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs or those who stood behind him wanted and upon the Magyar veterinary who could exclude Serbian swine and cattle at will from the Austro-Hungarian market. Doctor Goričar’s analysis of Maximilian Harden’s rôle in Vienna at the outbreak of the First Balkan War is accurate. He came to give them ginger and to put fight into them. The reviewer was then

engaged in research in the archives and knows what a stir Harden caused in official circles and how he impressed the audiences to which he lectured when he referred to a *mere rumor* that Herr von Ugron, the Austrian Minister at Belgrade, had been assassinated that day—with the remark, “I fear though that it is true.”¹

Heretofore the attempt to manufacture a cause of war out of the Prochaska affair which had its run in November and December, 1912, and out of the Palić affair in March, 1913, has received too little attention in the press outside of Central Europe. In each case, war was avoided only when Russia, backing down, advised Serbia and Montenegro to do likewise. Soon, thereafter, it was announced in each case that the “*rumors*” on which these “*incidents*” were based were “*unfounded*.”

Austria's part in the Albanian venture, the dramatic challenge of Count Tisza hurled at Russia in 1913, the suggestive parallel between Austrian and Prussian plans for the dismemberment of Russia in 1854 and later, the changed and, to some extent, bellicose attitude of Francis Joseph after the Treaty of Bukharest, all these things brought up by Doctor Goričar are now established facts. Count Tisza by his silence did help to bring on the war, but contrary to Doctor Goricear, we now know that he was silent because he himself opposed a military triumph and was won over only with difficulty. By silencing Magyar opposition, he presented them with a *fait accompli*. What Doctor Goričar writes about the German *casus belli*—the general Russian mobilization—will bear careful examination.

For the general reader, the book should prove to be a fascinating one. For the historian, its value lies primarily in that it gives the *clue* to many questions which the scientist may take up and follow along ground more firm than that of the propaganda journals of the Foreign Offices of Vienna and Berlin. Some discrepancies in dates and figures, as well as in cited quotations, have crept into the work where more accuracy in these particulars would have added to the undoubted value of the work.

The book will live. It is an important contribution. The War Party and particularly, Baron Conrad von Hoetzendorf, did wish for war—and they got it!

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The National Government of the United States. By EVERETT KIMBALL, Professor of Government in Smith College. (Ginn and Company. 1920. Pp. iv, 629.)

¹ See the *Neue Freie Presse*, November 11, 1912.